Telecom operators must not become content police
Telecommunications companies are the backbone of the Internet, akin to road maintenance operators tasked with ensuring smooth and functional infrastructure. Just as road operators are not expected to monitor vehicles for illegal goods, telecom operators should not be burdened with policing Internet content. Their role would shift drastically from facilitators to enforcers if tasked with such responsibilities.
Intermediaries Are Not Responsible for Data Content
Under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA), intermediaries like telecom companies are not liable for content transmitted or stored by their users under certain conditions. The DSA also prohibits general monitoring obligations. However, recent EU legislative initiatives have started imposing new responsibilities on intermediaries, stretching the limits of this limited liability.
For instance, under Article 17 of the DSM Directive, online content-sharing service providers might be held accountable for copyright infringements. Other regulations increasingly require telecom operators to block or monitor online content, such as those addressing terrorist content or child sexual abuse. Even seemingly unrelated laws, onto the operators, like those governing payment services, propose shifting liabilities, such as financial losses from spoofing.
Protecting Communications Secrecy
Commission proposals like the CSAM Regulation suggest requiring all communication services to inspect users’ messages, undermining encryption. Scanning messages before encryption negates its purpose, much like obliging postal workers to read letters before sealing them. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in Podchasov v. Russia (2024) that weakening encryption violates human rights. Yet, Europol and Member States’ police chiefs recently called for breaking encryption for investigations.
These proposals often lack technical understanding, expecting telecom companies to assess the legality of all communications—an impossible and intrusive task. Content regulation should target platforms or sources, not infrastructure providers.
Legislation that weakens communication secrecy threatens human rights, risking a surveillance state akin to China. Good intentions cannot justify such erosion of freedoms.
Asko Metsola
Former legal advisor of FiCom
